The requirement that prosecutors disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence under Brady v. Maryland (1963) and Giglio v. United States (1972) has given rise to one of the most contentious and constitutionally significant tools in the criminal legal system: the Brady list. Known by various names—Brady list, Giglio list, Do-Not-Call list, or Disclosure list—these rosters identify law enforcement officers whose credibility has been compromised, often due to documented dishonesty, misconduct, or sustained disciplinary actions that bear on their ability to testify truthfully.
Brady lists have evolved from informal prosecutorial notes to formalized systems with legal, ethical, and operational implications. They reflect an acknowledgment that the integrity of the justice system cannot be separated from the reliability of those who serve as its frontline witnesses. Yet, as simple as the principle sounds—track and disclose known credibility issues—the implementation of Brady lists is anything but uniform. Across jurisdictions, practices vary wildly. Some prosecutors maintain detailed, publicly accessible databases; others deny that such lists exist at all. Some law enforcement agencies fully cooperate in identifying Brady-material officers; others obstruct, conceal, or even retaliate against those attempting to flag misconduct.
This chapter will explore how Brady lists function in practice. It will examine their administrative mechanisms, legal foundations, operational uses, and the broader implications they have for prosecutors, defense attorneys, police departments, and public trust. We will also address some of the unresolved challenges that surround these lists—questions of fairness, transparency, privacy, and reform. Ultimately, we argue that while Brady lists are imperfect, they are essential. Without them, the obligation of truthfulness is left to hope and habit, rather than structured enforcement.
A Brady list is a roster maintained—typically by a prosecuting agency—of law enforcement officers whose credibility is sufficiently in question that their involvement in a case requires disclosure to the defense. Officers may be placed on a Brady list for various reasons:
Documented instances of dishonesty (e.g., falsifying reports, lying under oath)
Criminal charges or convictions
Sustained internal affairs findings related to truthfulness or misconduct
Allegations of coercion, abuse, or bias
Evidence of misconduct that undermines reliability as a witness
These lists are not databases of guilt or criminality; they are risk management tools for prosecutors. Their purpose is to ensure that defense attorneys are informed of any potential impeachment material, in compliance with Brady and Giglio. Importantly, inclusion on a Brady list does not necessarily imply the officer has committed a crime or even violated a departmental rule—only that there exists evidence which may be materially relevant to the defense.
In some jurisdictions, prosecutors use a tiered system, distinguishing between officers who are currently under investigation, officers with past but unresolved credibility concerns, and officers who have been formally disqualified from testifying. In others, the list may simply be a spreadsheet with names and internal notes. The criteria for inclusion are not always public or consistent, which leads to both operational confusion and legal conflict.
Responsibility for maintaining Brady lists generally falls to the prosecuting agency, such as a District Attorney’s office or State Attorney General. However, collaboration with law enforcement agencies is essential, as prosecutors often rely on police departments to flag officers with relevant disciplinary records. This relationship creates several complications:
When prosecutors independently maintain the list, they typically draw from sources such as:
Internal affairs summaries
Civilian complaints
Personnel records (when accessible)
Judicial findings in prior cases
Notifications from police leadership
Some prosecutors proactively review law enforcement personnel files, conduct regular audits, and create disclosure units specifically to track Brady material. Others operate in a reactive mode, only updating the list when issues arise in litigation or media reports.
Law enforcement agencies often resist full cooperation with Brady list compilation. Reasons vary: fear of reputational damage, concern over civil liability, pressure from police unions, or a belief that internal discipline should not affect legal proceedings. Some departments deny prosecutors access to personnel records entirely, invoking privacy laws or collective bargaining agreements.
This resistance can severely limit the accuracy of Brady lists. In jurisdictions without subpoena power or mandatory reporting laws, prosecutors may have little ability to verify or update their records. As a result, officers who should be flagged may remain unlisted, while the defense remains unaware of critical credibility concerns.
There is no national standard governing how officers are selected for inclusion on Brady lists. Criteria and procedures vary by jurisdiction, but some common mechanisms include:
When an officer is found by internal affairs to have committed misconduct—particularly lying, falsifying reports, or excessive use of force—prosecutors are often notified and may review the findings for disclosure implications.
Judges occasionally make formal credibility determinations in written opinions. If a court finds that an officer testified falsely or withheld information, prosecutors typically flag the officer for inclusion on the list.
In some cases, prosecutors independently determine that an officer is not credible based on patterns in their testimony, inconsistencies in reports, or prior incidents. These decisions are discretionary and may or may not involve formal review.
Defense attorneys often surface issues of officer credibility through cross-examination or motions practice. These challenges may prompt prosecutors to review records and update the Brady list accordingly.
While some offices offer due process mechanisms for officers to challenge their inclusion (e.g., hearings, appeals), many do not. This leads to criticisms that Brady lists lack procedural fairness, especially when inclusion results in diminished career opportunities or public exposure.
The consequences of being listed vary depending on the jurisdiction and the extent of the officer’s credibility issues.
The most immediate consequence is the legal requirement that the prosecution disclose the officer’s status to the defense in any case where the officer is a material witness. This may include sharing the underlying misconduct record, a summary of findings, or other impeachment material.
Failure to disclose can lead to:
Suppression of evidence
Dismissal of charges
Post-conviction relief
Prosecutorial sanctions
Civil rights lawsuits
In this way, the Brady list serves as a protective mechanism—not just for defendants, but for the integrity of the prosecution itself.
Officers who are deemed "Giglio-impaired"—that is, incapable of testifying without impeachment—may become functionally unemployable in investigative roles. Police departments may reassign them to desk duty, administrative roles, or non-law enforcement positions. In some cases, departments will terminate employment or accept resignations in lieu of firing.
In jurisdictions where Brady lists are public, inclusion can lead to media scrutiny, reputational damage, and community backlash. While transparency is essential for accountability, it also raises questions about privacy, due process, and the potential for misinterpretation or misuse of information.
The Brady list system, while essential, is riddled with legal and ethical tensions. These include:
Critics argue that being placed on a Brady list can amount to an administrative punishment without proper procedural safeguards. Officers may be listed based on allegations rather than sustained findings, or without an opportunity to contest the facts. This raises concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process and may conflict with collective bargaining protections.
Prosecutors wield enormous discretion in compiling and using Brady lists. Without clear criteria or transparency, this discretion can be abused or inconsistently applied. An officer in one jurisdiction may be listed for a minor infraction, while another may escape scrutiny despite more serious misconduct. This inconsistency can have wide-ranging consequences for defendants and for equal protection under the law.
Police unions often contest the creation or expansion of Brady lists, arguing that such systems circumvent disciplinary appeals and unjustly harm members. In some cities, union contracts prevent departments from sharing disciplinary findings with prosecutors unless compelled by subpoena. These provisions act as structural shields against accountability and compromise the public’s right to a fair trial.
Improving the efficacy and fairness of Brady lists requires a multi-pronged strategy:
A national or state-level standard for inclusion would enhance consistency and reduce the perception of arbitrariness. Criteria could include:
Sustained findings of dishonesty
Criminal convictions
Judicial credibility rulings
Patterned complaints or lawsuits
Clear standards would help ensure that inclusion is based on material relevance, not prosecutorial whim.
Brady lists should be subject to independent review, either through inspector general offices, civilian oversight boards, or judicial panels. This ensures that listings are credible, fair, and defensible. Oversight also reduces the risk of retaliation or political misuse.
Public access to Brady lists increases accountability, but must be balanced against privacy concerns. Redacted summaries, anonymized data, or tiered disclosures may be appropriate in some contexts. What matters most is that the public understands how the list works, why it matters, and how officers are held to account.
States should integrate Brady listings into their officer licensing and decertification processes. An officer who is unfit to testify should not be permitted to move to another jurisdiction and continue policing. A centralized reporting system would prevent the “wandering officer” phenomenon and close the loopholes that currently undermine reform.
The mechanics of Brady lists may appear administrative, but their implications strike at the heart of due process, public safety, and institutional legitimacy. They are both a mirror and a measure—reflecting the reliability of the criminal justice system while also serving as a metric of its ethical discipline. A well-maintained, transparent, and fairly enforced Brady list is one of the few tools available to ensure that law enforcement officers who have failed in their duty of truth do not continue to wield unchecked power in courtrooms.
In the chapters that follow, we will examine how these lists impact prosecution and defense strategy, the consequences of non-disclosure, and the evolving debate around their reform. For now, it is clear: the integrity of our justice system depends not just on the truth, but on the systems we build to protect it.