Indiana

Overview

Indiana presents a troubling mix of robust prosecutorial power, limited public access to officer misconduct records, and a conspicuous absence of institutionalized Giglio or Brady tracking mechanisms. Despite clear constitutional mandates, Indiana has no statute requiring prosecutorial offices to track or disclose officer credibility issues, no centralized Brady List, and no public system for defense attorneys to verify whether a testifying officer has a history of misconduct. With 91 elected county prosecutors and over 400 distinct law enforcement agencies, Indiana's criminal justice framework is highly decentralized, and compliance with disclosure obligations is left largely to individual discretion. In this environment, the foundational duty to tell the truth is all too often undermined by silence, secrecy, and structural inertia.

Brief Description of Legal Landscape

Indiana’s court system comprises trial-level circuit and superior courts, a Court of Appeals, and the Indiana Supreme Court. Each of the state’s counties elects a Prosecuting Attorney who exercises independent authority over charging decisions, trial strategy, and discovery practices. Prosecutorial disclosure is governed primarily by Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.1 and case law interpreting Brady and Giglio obligations. However, the rule requires only that the prosecution “permit inspection” of material evidence—it does not expressly define or mandate the disclosure of impeachment material related to law enforcement witnesses.

Law enforcement officers are certified by the Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board (ILETB), which may suspend or revoke credentials for certain misconduct. However, there is no statutory obligation for ILETB or individual departments to notify prosecutors of sustained findings that would impair an officer’s courtroom credibility.

Historical Context

Indiana’s legal institutions have historically prioritized local control and prosecutorial discretion over centralized accountability. In the absence of statutory mandates, most counties have failed to develop formal policies or tracking systems for officer credibility issues. As a result, known Brady/Giglio material is frequently disclosed late, if at all—and often only after defense attorneys file targeted discovery motions or uncover evidence through civil litigation.

While Indiana has not faced the same volume of high-profile wrongful conviction cases as some larger states, its rural and suburban jurisdictions face the same systemic risks: limited public oversight, law enforcement unions exerting political pressure, and a lack of institutional transparency. Without judicial or legislative intervention, the duty to disclose is diluted by habit, convenience, and isolation.

Legal Framework and Precedents

Constitutional Provisions and State Statutes

Indiana’s Constitution provides due process rights under Article I, Section 12 and confrontation rights under Article I, Section 13, mirroring federal constitutional guarantees. Disclosure obligations are grounded in:

• Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1: Allows for pretrial discovery and requires the prosecution to disclose relevant evidence—but without specifically naming impeachment material.

• Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(d): Requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory information that tends to negate guilt or mitigate punishment. However, the rule is rarely enforced in practice.

• Indiana Access to Public Records Act (APRA), Ind. Code § 5-14-3: Provides access to government records, but includes broad exemptions for law enforcement personnel files and investigatory records.

There is no statute mandating the creation of Brady Lists, disclosure of sustained misconduct findings, or training on Giglio compliance for prosecutors or police officers.

Relevant Case Law and Judicial Interpretations

Indiana courts have applied Brady and Giglio on a case-by-case basis, usually requiring proof of material prejudice before granting relief:

• Taylor v. State, 697 N.E.2d 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998): Held that failure to disclose impeachment evidence relating to a key prosecution witness warranted reversal, affirming the applicability of Giglio.

• Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. 2007): Reaffirmed that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory and impeachment material but emphasized the defendant's burden to show materiality.

• State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012): Ruled that undisclosed promises made to a cooperating witness violated due process.

Yet despite these rulings, Indiana courts have not imposed systemic reforms or interpreted Giglio as requiring structural changes to prosecutorial practice.

Implementation and Enforcement

Law Enforcement Policies and Training

The Indiana Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) provides basic and in-service training for officers but does not include mandated instruction on Brady/Giglio obligations. Agencies handle their own internal affairs investigations, and there is no legal requirement to report sustained findings of dishonesty to prosecutors.

Most departments do not maintain Giglio-related records in a form accessible to prosecutors. In larger departments like Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), internal findings are often shielded from public view under APRA exemptions and union agreements. Prosecutors may not even be notified when an officer has been found to lie, falsify records, or engage in misconduct.

Some county prosecutors have informal “Do Not Call” or “Giglio” lists, but they are not public, not standardized, and not subject to audit or oversight. In the vast majority of Indiana counties, no such list exists at all.

Oversight Mechanisms and Accountability Structures

There is no independent state entity tasked with overseeing prosecutorial compliance with Brady or Giglio obligations. Misconduct complaints against prosecutors are handled by the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission, but few public cases have addressed disclosure violations. The Public Access Counselor’s Office exists to enforce APRA compliance but does not have jurisdiction over prosecutorial discretion or police discipline records.

The Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board has decertification authority, but it does not maintain a publicly accessible misconduct database and does not coordinate with prosecutorial offices for testimonial eligibility.

Case Studies from the State

Significant Cases Illustrating Issues of Candor

1. Derrick Fields v. State (2009–2015)
   Fields was convicted of robbery based in part on testimony from an officer later found to have lied during an unrelated investigation. No Giglio disclosure was made, and defense counsel only discovered the misconduct during post-conviction litigation. The court ultimately upheld the conviction, finding the evidence immaterial.

2. Evansville Police Officer Brady Violation (2017)
   An officer was placed on administrative leave for falsifying documents but continued to testify in unrelated cases without disclosure to defense counsel. No formal list or warning system existed to flag the officer’s impaired credibility.

3. Marion County Internal Misconduct Memos (2020–2023)
   Whistleblower reports alleged that the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office maintained an internal list of problematic officers but did not consistently share the list with defense counsel. The office refused to confirm or deny the list’s existence when queried by local journalists and defense bar associations.

Outcomes and Implications

These cases illustrate the structural deficiencies in Indiana’s disclosure system. Even when misconduct is known internally, it is rarely memorialized in a way that ensures future defendants are protected. With no mandated tracking, prosecutors can call officers to testify without disclosing their credibility issues—sometimes without even knowing they exist. Meanwhile, defense attorneys must rely on luck, leaks, or civil litigation to uncover what the Constitution guarantees them as a right.

Challenges and Gaps

Identified Issues within the State’s System

• No Statewide Giglio Tracking: Indiana has no mechanism to identify or share information about officers who are unfit to testify.

• Discretionary and Inconsistent Disclosure: Each prosecutor determines what qualifies as Brady/Giglio material, with no external review or standardization.

• Public Records Exemptions: APRA protects most police personnel records from disclosure, even when misconduct is sustained and credibility is at issue.

• Lack of Oversight and Audit: There is no state agency responsible for ensuring disclosure compliance or prosecutorial integrity.

Legislative and Institutional Barriers

Efforts to increase law enforcement transparency—such as proposed reforms to public records access or police decertification reporting—have stalled in the legislature. Prosecutors and police unions maintain strong influence, and the culture of disclosure remains insular. The absence of legal mandates or public pressure has allowed outdated and inconsistent practices to persist unchallenged.

Recommendations

Suggested Improvements in Law, Policy, and Practice

1. Create a Statewide Giglio List Framework: Enact legislation requiring prosecutors to maintain and share a Giglio List of officers with sustained credibility issues.

2. Require POST–Prosecutor Coordination: Mandate that ILETB share disciplinary outcomes with relevant prosecutorial offices and link to testimonial eligibility.

3. Amend Discovery Rules: Modify Rule 3.1 to expressly include impeachment material and to require affirmative disclosure rather than mere availability upon request.

4. Standardize Prosecutor Training: Require Brady/Giglio-specific training for all new prosecutors and CLE recertification for practicing attorneys.

Recommendations for Enhanced Transparency and Accountability

1. Expand Public Access to Officer Misconduct Records: Reform APRA to ensure that sustained findings of dishonesty are no longer protected by personnel exemptions.

2. Establish Independent Oversight of Prosecutors: Create a state-level ombudsman or commission to audit Brady compliance and investigate misconduct complaints.

3. Judicial Pretrial Screening for Giglio Issues: Require courts to hold evidentiary hearings when officers with known disciplinary histories are expected to testify.

4. Defense Access to POST Discipline Logs: Ensure that defense attorneys have timely access to officer decertification or suspension data via a secure, shared database.

Conclusion

Indiana’s justice system adheres to the letter of Brady and Giglio—but rarely to their spirit. In the absence of formal policies, independent oversight, or public transparency, the constitutional right to exculpatory and impeachment evidence is often honored in theory, but denied in practice. To safeguard the integrity of its criminal justice system, Indiana must build structures that do not rely on prosecutorial benevolence or adversarial discovery alone. Candor is not optional. It is the cornerstone of justice—and it must be codified, tracked, and enforced accordingly.