Delaware is unique among U.S. states in its size, structure, and insularity—attributes that both facilitate and hinder transparency. With a single unified state court system, a centralized Department of Justice, and fewer than 50 law enforcement agencies, Delaware is well-positioned to implement consistent and accountable disclosure policies. Yet, the state has no formal or public Brady List system, no statutory framework for the identification or tracking of Giglio-impaired officers, and only limited mechanisms for prosecutorial oversight. Despite its compact scale and professionalized legal culture, Delaware operates largely without the institutional infrastructure needed to ensure that officers who have demonstrated dishonesty are removed from the courtroom and, where appropriate, from the profession. The result is a state where candor remains conditional and transparency is limited by default.
Delaware’s legal framework is centralized. Its judiciary is composed of the Court of Common Pleas, Superior Court, Family Court, and the Delaware Supreme Court. The Delaware Department of Justice (DOJ)—not county prosecutors—handles all criminal prosecutions in the state, providing an opportunity for top-down policy uniformity. However, the DOJ has not implemented a formal or public Brady List system, and prosecutors rely heavily on informal communication with law enforcement agencies to identify credibility issues.
Disclosure obligations in Delaware are governed by court rule rather than statute. Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 and longstanding Brady/Giglio case law establish the requirement that exculpatory and impeachment evidence must be disclosed. However, unlike some other states, Delaware has no legislative or judicial requirement for law enforcement agencies to proactively report disciplinary findings to prosecutors, nor is there a system to flag officers with sustained findings of dishonesty or misconduct that affect courtroom credibility.
Delaware’s legal system has traditionally been characterized by its discretion-heavy model and preference for internal resolution over public accountability. While it is one of the most efficient and compact legal jurisdictions in the nation, it has historically lacked external transparency, especially concerning prosecutorial and law enforcement conduct.
There are few documented large-scale scandals involving law enforcement dishonesty in Delaware—due in part to the state's size, but also to its restrictive public records laws and limited media exposure. This has enabled the quiet handling of misconduct and a reluctance to create permanent, trackable records of officer credibility issues. The centralization of prosecution under the state DOJ provides theoretical efficiency, but in practice, it has resulted in a lack of public visibility into how—and whether—Brady and Giglio obligations are consistently enforced.
Delaware’s Constitution guarantees due process and a fair trial under Article I, Sections 7 and 9. These rights mirror those of the U.S. Constitution and underlie the state’s disclosure obligations.
Key components of the current legal framework include:
Superior Court Criminal Rule 16: Requires the disclosure of any exculpatory evidence and material that may be favorable to the defense.
Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(d): Adopts the ABA standard, requiring prosecutors to timely disclose evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the accused.
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (29 Del. C. §§ 10001–10007): Provides broad exemptions for police personnel records, internal investigations, and other documents that could reveal officer misconduct.
Notably, Delaware has no statute requiring the creation of a Brady List or the publication of law enforcement disciplinary records—nor any state law that defines how prosecutors should track Giglio-impaired officers.
Delaware courts have acknowledged Brady and Giglio obligations but have not expanded them into structural mandates.
Johnson v. State, 24 A.3d 411 (Del. 2011): Affirmed that the prosecution must disclose impeachment material concerning key witnesses.
Taylor v. State, 76 A.3d 791 (Del. 2013): Reiterated that nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence can constitute reversible error, but emphasized materiality and prejudice as necessary elements.
Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556 (Del. 2001): Emphasized the scope of the prosecution’s obligations, but also underscored that timing and perceived importance play a role in judicial assessment of violations.
There has been no Delaware Supreme Court decision requiring or even encouraging the creation of a Giglio tracking system—leaving such decisions entirely within the discretion of the DOJ and individual agencies.
The Council on Police Training (COPT) governs law enforcement certification in Delaware, but its mandate does not include tracking or reporting Brady/Giglio violations. Officers may lose certification for serious misconduct, including criminal acts, but there is no publicly accessible list of decertified officers, nor a requirement to inform prosecutors of misconduct that may impair courtroom credibility.
There is no uniform training mandate for law enforcement officers on Brady or Giglio obligations. Most agencies rely on department-level policies—or in some cases, none at all. Similarly, the Delaware DOJ has not published a formal Brady/Giglio compliance protocol, and it does not operate a centralized database of officers with known credibility issues.
While Delaware’s small size and centralized prosecution theoretically simplify communication between agencies and prosecutors, the absence of binding policy results in inconsistency and opacity. Officers known to have lied in reports or testimony may still be called to testify in unrelated cases without any disclosure to defense counsel.
The Delaware DOJ lacks an independent oversight office for prosecutorial misconduct. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) under the Delaware Supreme Court investigates ethical violations by attorneys, but very few public disciplinary actions have been taken against prosecutors for Brady violations.
Similarly, the COPT does not publish disciplinary outcomes or track officers whose conduct raises Giglio concerns. Civilian review boards are rare and have no statewide authority. While larger cities such as Wilmington have internal affairs units, their findings are generally shielded from public view under FOIA exemptions, and no requirement exists to share those findings with the DOJ or the courts.
Thomas Capano Case (1996–2001) – The high-profile prosecution of a politically connected attorney involved questionable evidence handling and speculative witness testimony. Though not a classic Brady case, the controversy surrounding disclosure highlighted the DOJ’s discretion-heavy practices and lack of external scrutiny.
Michael Robinson Case (2014) – Convicted of murder, Robinson’s defense uncovered, post-conviction, that a key state witness had a criminal history that had not been disclosed. The appellate court found no reversible error under Brady, reinforcing the judiciary’s conservative application of the materiality standard.
Unreported Giglio Issues in Delaware DOJ – Confidential reports from defense attorneys (reported in local advocacy circles) suggest that some officers with prior credibility issues continue to testify across counties without being flagged. Because no public Brady List exists, and internal DOJ protocols are not published, it is impossible to verify these claims or assess their scope.
These examples highlight the quiet persistence of disclosure failures in a state with few mechanisms for surfacing or correcting them. The absence of a proactive system for identifying, tracking, and disclosing officer credibility problems leaves Delaware’s defense bar in a disadvantaged position and erodes the promise of equal justice. Moreover, the lack of public transparency limits the ability of the press or the public to demand accountability.
No Public or Internal Brady List: Delaware DOJ has no formal system for flagging or disclosing credibility-impaired officers.
FOIA Exemptions: Personnel records and internal affairs findings are almost entirely shielded from public review.
Lack of Independent Oversight: No state-level agency audits Brady compliance or investigates prosecutorial misconduct related to disclosure.
Absence of Uniform Training or Policy: Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors lack consistent standards or expectations for Giglio compliance.
Efforts to increase transparency are regularly opposed by police unions and, at times, institutional inertia within the DOJ. The state's legal infrastructure reinforces confidentiality, and political leadership has been reluctant to prioritize prosecutorial or law enforcement reform unless catalyzed by crisis. With no public scandals forcing reform and minimal media coverage, policy change has been slow and fragmented.
Establish a Formal Brady/Giglio Compliance Policy: The Delaware DOJ should develop and publish a uniform, binding protocol for tracking and disclosing officer credibility issues.
Create a Statewide Credibility Database: Establish a confidential but accessible registry of law enforcement officers with sustained findings of dishonesty or bias.
Amend FOIA Statutes: Expand public access to records of substantiated misconduct that affect officer credibility or involve false statements.
Mandate Training for All Stakeholders: Require regular training on Brady and Giglio for all prosecutors, police, and public defenders.
Independent Prosecutorial Oversight: Empower an ombudsman or review body to audit the DOJ’s compliance with Brady/Giglio obligations.
COPT Reform and Reporting Requirements: Require the Council on Police Training to publish disciplinary outcomes and share Giglio-relevant findings with the DOJ.
Civilian Complaint Tracking System: Create a public dashboard of complaints against law enforcement, including outcomes, to foster early identification of repeat credibility issues.
Cross-County Disclosure Mandate: Require that Giglio information follow officers who transfer between agencies or jurisdictions.
Delaware’s small scale and centralized legal system should make it a leader in law enforcement accountability—but instead, it remains mired in discretion, opacity, and institutional silence. Without a statutory Brady List, public access to personnel records, or independent oversight of prosecutorial practices, truth-telling in the courtroom is more promise than practice. The infrastructure to do better exists. What remains lacking is the political will to prioritize candor over convenience and justice over quiet deference. Until those priorities shift, the people of Delaware remain dependent on the integrity of individuals rather than the reliability of institutions.