The District of Columbia occupies a distinct position in the American legal system. It is not a state, but it operates with many of the same legal and judicial functions—albeit under unique federal oversight. Its singular status comes with both advantages and limitations when it comes to law enforcement transparency and prosecutorial disclosure obligations. The centralized structure of the D.C. government, including the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) for civil matters and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO-DC) for most criminal prosecutions, theoretically allows for consistent Brady and Giglio enforcement. In practice, however, accountability is complicated by overlapping jurisdictions, federal staffing, and limited local autonomy over law enforcement. The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), D.C.'s primary local police force, is among the largest in the country—but it operates in a disclosure system where the rules are often defined by federal prosecutorial discretion rather than municipal policy.
D.C. is home to a dual prosecution system: the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (a federal entity under the Department of Justice) handles nearly all adult felony and many misdemeanor cases, while the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia handles juvenile offenses and certain local infractions. The judiciary is likewise split between the D.C. Superior Court (the trial court for local matters) and the D.C. Court of Appeals, which serves as the highest court for the District.
Disclosure obligations in criminal cases fall primarily on the USAO-DC, which is bound by Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States, DOJ policies, and relevant federal court decisions. However, because the U.S. Attorney’s Office is a federal agency, it is not directly accountable to D.C. voters or city officials. This federal-local divide significantly affects the visibility, standardization, and enforceability of Brady and Giglio obligations in practice.
Meanwhile, the MPD does not publicly maintain or publish a Brady List or Giglio database, and no D.C. law compels it to report officer misconduct to prosecutors or the public. This creates a transparency vacuum, especially given the MPD’s size, scope, and history of internal disciplinary controversies.
D.C.’s legal and policing systems have long reflected its status as a federal district with local governance constraints. Historically, the city’s residents have had limited control over prosecutorial and law enforcement practices because key powers are held by federally appointed officials, particularly the U.S. Attorney for D.C. This has created accountability challenges that are not present in traditional state systems.
The 1990s and 2000s saw repeated calls for local control over prosecutorial functions and increased police oversight, especially as MPD faced public scrutiny for high-profile shootings, racially biased stop-and-frisk practices, and officer-involved deaths. Despite this, the federal control over criminal prosecution has remained intact, and no statutory Brady List requirement has been established by either the D.C. Council or the federal government.
While federal oversight can bring a measure of professionalism, it has also shielded local prosecutorial decisions from public challenge, and it has limited the District’s ability to legislate reforms like mandatory disclosure registries or independent prosecutorial oversight.
D.C. residents are protected under the U.S. Constitution, including the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which provide the basis for Brady and Giglio obligations. The D.C. Code includes some discovery requirements and police accountability measures, but there is no statutory mandate for the creation of a Brady List or Giglio disclosure protocol.
Key sources of disclosure obligation include:
Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (D.C. Superior Court): Governs the general discovery process.
DOJ Justice Manual § 9-5.001: Requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence. This policy applies to USAO-DC prosecutors but lacks the force of law.
MPD General Orders: Contain internal disciplinary protocols but do not create public access to sustained misconduct or mandate notification of prosecutorial offices.
In 2020, the D.C. Council passed the Comprehensive Policing and Justice Reform Emergency Amendment Act, which mandated the release of some internal affairs and use-of-force records—but it still did not require the public identification of officers with credibility issues.
D.C. courts have addressed Brady and Giglio in several notable cases:
Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094 (D.C. 2011): The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed a conviction due to suppression of exculpatory evidence, reinforcing the materiality standard in Brady cases.
Zanders v. United States, 999 A.2d 149 (D.C. 2010): Found that prosecutors’ failure to disclose a cooperating witness’s incentive agreement warranted a new trial.
Vines v. United States, 70 A.3d 1170 (D.C. 2013): Emphasized the ongoing duty to disclose impeachment evidence throughout trial proceedings.
While the judiciary has upheld constitutional disclosure duties, it has not imposed structural reforms—such as requiring public Brady Lists or mandating inter-agency reporting protocols.
The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) handles most local policing in the District. It maintains an Internal Affairs Division and an Office of Risk Management, but these entities do not publish a Brady List, and there is no official mechanism for sharing disciplinary findings with prosecutors absent a case-specific inquiry.
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C. reportedly maintains an internal list of law enforcement witnesses with potential impeachment concerns, but this list is not public and is rarely disclosed unless triggered by defense discovery motions or internal review. There is no statutory requirement for this information to be shared across jurisdictions or with defense counsel proactively.
MPD training on Brady/Giglio obligations is limited and typically internal, not standardized or subject to public audit. Similarly, USAO-DC training follows federal guidelines but is not subject to local civilian oversight.
D.C. has several layers of police oversight, including the Office of Police Complaints (OPC) and the Police Complaints Board, both of which investigate civilian complaints and make policy recommendations. However, these bodies lack subpoena power over prosecutors and have no role in Brady or Giglio enforcement.
For prosecutors, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) within DOJ investigates misconduct, but these investigations are rarely public and are not subject to local oversight. The D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility may discipline attorneys, including prosecutors, for ethical violations—but such cases are rare and not typically tied to Brady failures unless they are egregious and well-documented.
Jeffrey Clark Homicide Case (2012) – A USAO-DC prosecutor failed to disclose critical information about a government witness who had received leniency in another case. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, citing a violation of Brady and reinforcing the need for full impeachment disclosures.
Donald Gates Exoneration (2009) – Gates was imprisoned for 27 years based on false FBI forensic testimony and a flawed investigation. The U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately conceded error, and the case spurred national calls for greater scrutiny of expert testimony—but did not lead to any local Brady reforms.
MPD Officer Dismissals (Ongoing) – Investigative reports from local media and the ACLU have revealed that MPD has quietly allowed officers with known histories of misconduct—including falsification and abuse—to remain employed or transfer without public accountability. The absence of a Giglio disclosure mandate means defense attorneys often learn of credibility issues only through litigation or civil discovery.
These cases underscore D.C.’s systemic challenge: disclosure failures are usually discovered post hoc and only in high-profile cases. The centralization of prosecution under the DOJ reduces opportunities for local reform, and the lack of public disclosure policies means that the same officers may testify in multiple cases despite documented integrity issues. The combination of federal oversight and limited transparency mechanisms weakens the District’s ability to deliver consistently fair trials.
No Public Brady List: Neither USAO-DC nor MPD maintains or publishes a list of officers with known credibility issues.
Lack of Statutory Mandate: No D.C. law requires Brady/Giglio tracking, reporting, or disclosure beyond case-by-case obligations.
Jurisdictional Fragmentation: Federal and local authorities operate separately, with no unified policy or oversight mechanism.
Limited Civilian Oversight: OPC has no authority over prosecutorial practices, and internal DOJ investigations are not publicly reviewable.
Because the U.S. Attorney’s Office is federally appointed, local lawmakers have no power to mandate disclosure policies, Brady List maintenance, or reform of internal practices. Meanwhile, MPD’s administrative culture and union protections make it difficult to enforce disciplinary consequences or transparency mandates without substantial political effort. Reforms passed by the D.C. Council are often limited to the administrative control they do possess—and rarely extend to criminal procedure.
Codify Brady/Giglio Obligations in D.C. Law: The D.C. Council should pass legislation requiring MPD to report officer credibility issues to prosecutorial agencies.
Create a Public Disclosure Registry: Establish a database of sustained misconduct findings that implicate officer credibility, managed by the Office of Police Complaints.
Standardize USAO-DC Disclosure Practices: The DOJ should mandate that USAO-DC maintain and share a formal Giglio List with defense counsel.
Enhance MPD Training: Require annual in-service training on Brady/Giglio disclosure responsibilities for all officers and supervisors.
Public DOJ Compliance Reporting: Require the USAO-DC to issue annual reports on Brady and Giglio compliance, including metrics and case summaries.
Link MPD Discipline to POST Standards: Integrate MPD discipline into a decertification framework similar to those used in state POST systems.
Independent Prosecutorial Oversight: Advocate for an independent ombudsman within the DOJ Office of Inspector General to oversee Brady compliance in D.C.
Community Legal Clinics and Defense Access: Fund programs to assist defense attorneys in identifying and litigating Giglio issues, particularly in indigent defense cases.
The District of Columbia’s legal system is uniquely centralized and professionalized—yet fundamentally disconnected from local democratic accountability. While the federal structure of prosecution provides resources and stability, it also insulates Brady and Giglio practices from meaningful oversight or reform. Without a statutory framework, public transparency, or mandatory disclosure protocols, D.C. remains vulnerable to silent miscarriages of justice—ones that no jury can detect and no judge is required to prevent unless prompted. Only by embracing transparency and relinquishing discretion as the default can the District fulfill its constitutional promise of fairness for all.